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Tax compliance costs: A business administration perspective 
Sebastian Eichfelder





The paper analyses the relationship of tax compliance costs and business strategy. Due to 
instruments, like information technology, simplified cash accounting or outsourcing 
compliance activities to tax advisers, private businesses have a set of strategies to optimize 
their tax compliance cost burden. Under the assumption of rational choice a private business 
should choose a cost-optimal administration strategy. In spite of that we find empirical 
evidence for small German businesses using only insufficiently the support of external tax 
advisers. Therefore, a considerable number of small businesses in Germany could reduce their 
compliance cost burden by a higher degree of outsourcing tax processes. In contrast, we find 
no significant evidence for a cost reduction by an electronic data interchange with the tax and 
social insurance authorities or by a simplified cash accounting method for tax purposes. 
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1 Introduction 
The complexity of taxation has been a widely discussed subject in the public finance literature 
(inter alia Kaplow 1996, Munk 2008). From an economic perspective tax complexity can be 
measured by the costs of the bureaucratic activities in calculating and remitting the tax and 
social insurance debts to the authorities.
1 This economic burden can be denominated as the 
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1   In accordance to the OECD (2006) we interpret also social insurance contributions as taxes in a broader sense. 
This approach is also chosen by the empirical literature about the compliance costs of wage taxation (inter 
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compliance costs of the taxation system. There are at least three reasons why this specific 
form of transaction costs can be regarded as a major economic problem: 
•  Tax compliance costs reduce the resources of private businesses without raising the 
financial budget of the government. Thus they can be regarded as a waste of economic 
resources. 
•  Empirical evidence suggests that the economic burden of tax compliance decreases in 
business size (OECD 2001) and rises in the international orientation of businesses 
(Blumenthal and Slemrod 1995). These effects could have a negative impact on the 
competitiveness of small and medium-sized businesses and reduce their access to 
international markets. 
•  Tax compliance costs seem to be connected to the compliance level. Hence, they 
could raise the degree of tax evasion (Erard and Ho 2003). 
Since the groundbreaking surveys of Sandford in the UK (Sandford 1973) and Slemrod in the 
U.S. (Slemrod and Sorum 1984) the measurement of tax compliance costs has progressed 
significantly (see Allers (1994) and Evans (2003) for a comprehensive review). The necessity 
of measuring compliance cost burdens is nowadays widely accepted as can be demonstrated 
by the implementation of the standard cost model in European countries (Nijsen and Vellinga 
2002) or of the ITBM model in the United States (Guyton et a. 2003).  
From a business administration perspective the compliance cost burdens of private businesses 
are not only affected by the design and the implementation of the tax system but also by the 
compliance strategy of the taxpayer. Like has been stated in the literature, the way taxpayers 
prepare and submit their tax returns changed dramatically in the last decades. There has been 
a considerable growth in the usage of tax administration software and in the outsourcing of 
tax processes to external advisers. According to Guyton et al. (2005) the share of self-
prepared tax returns without software in the U.S. dropped between 1993 and 2003 from about 
41% to 13%, while the paid preparer use rose from 51% to 62%. The number of electronic 
declarations in Germany increased from about 27,000 in 1999 to 8.2 million in 2008 
(Bayerisches Landesamt für Steuern 2009). An increase in the outsourcing of tax 
administration processes has already been reported by McKinstry and Baldry (1997) for 
Australia as well as by Collard et al. (1998) for Great Britain. Hence, it is an important 
question of research how these different compliance strategies impact the administrative cost 
burdens of private taxpayers and the economy as a whole.   3  
 
According to the descriptive studies of Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) and Collard and 
Godwin (1999) the cost efficient tax compliance strategy (for example outsourcing to an 
external adviser) depends on business size, with taxpayers on average choosing a cost-optimal 
compliance strategy. Contrasting these contributions Hansford et al. (2003) as well as DeLuca 
et al. (2005) find higher compliance costs for taxpayers relying on the help of tax advisers. 
Guyton et al. (2005) determine higher average compliance costs of paid preparers and 
software preparers. But controlling for alternative influence factors and selection bias, they 
find taxpayers regularly choosing a cost-efficient compliance strategy. Hudson and Godwin 
(2000) affirm this result for most strategies but find also evidence for a cost-inefficient use of 
a specialist tax bureau. A deficiency of all these contributions lies in the fact that the 
compliance strategy is measured exclusively by dummy variables. Hence, the degree of 
outsourcing or of the software application is not taken into account. 
The relationship of compliance costs and software usage has already been analysed by 
Vaillancourt (1989) who finds no significant evidence for a cost reduction by electronic 
administration tools. Hansford et al. (2003) find higher compliance costs for businesses using 
a computer system for tax administration. In contrast, Verwaal (2000) substantiates a 
significant reduction of compliance costs of international transactions by the usage of 
information systems or an electronic data interchange with the authorities. He reports no 
significant effect for an electronic data interchange with other businesses. Kopczuk and Pop-
Eleches (2007) find evidence that the participation in the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 
U.S. is significantly correlated with e-filing. This result can be taken as a hint on possible 
compliance cost reductions due to an electronic data interchange with the authorities. 
In addition to outsourcing and e-filing taxpayers may also use options inherent in the tax law 
to simplify their tax return and reduce their compliance cost level. Slemrod (1989) and Pitt 
and Slemrod (1989) find significant evidence for a considerable cost increase by itemizing 
deductions. Correspondingly Lerman and Lee (2005) report higher compliance costs for 
taxpayers being subject to an alternative minimum tax (AMT). Slemrod (1996) discusses a 
likely cost reduction by a cash-based income taxation. Up to our knowledge there is no 
empirical evidence on the effect of cash accounting on the compliance cost burden. 
In our contribution we use a data set of 1,220 German businesses to analyse the relationship 
of tax compliance costs and compliance strategies. In detail we analyse the effects of 
outsourcing obligations to external advisers, of an electronic data interchange with the tax and 
social insurance authorities (e-filing), of applying a simplified cash accounting method for tax   4  
 
purposes and of substituting internal personnel resources by capital (for example tax 
administration software). Methodologically we enhance the measurement of compliance 
strategies by not only considering a dummy variable for outsourcing and capital-intensive 
strategies but also by taking into account the share of the accordant costs. Furthermore, we are 
up to our knowledge the first contribution analysing the effect of cash accounting on the 
compliance costs of private businesses. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we deploy a simple rational approach of 
optimal tax administration to develop our hypotheses for the empirical investigation. Section 
3 elucidates the applied data set, estimation strategy and the regression results. The findings 
of our empirical analysis are interpreted in section 4. The paper is concluded by section 5. 
 
2 Tax compliance costs and administration strategy 
For first we analyse the relationship between tax compliance costs and business strategy by a 
simple model of rational choice. Similar to Slemrod (2001) we assume a rational decision 
maker considering taxes as well as compliance costs in maximising its net income Y . We 
initially neglect deficiencies of rational choice like bounded rationality or limited information. 
The net income consists of the gross earnings E  being reduced by tax payments T  as well as 
by the costs of complying with the tax law C .
2  
The tax burden T  rises with the gross earnings E  and is reduced by the deductibility of the 
compliance costs C . Furthermore, the tax burden may be affected by the use of specific tax 
options  k O . Tax planning options as income shifting or the choice of an optimal depreciation 
method are generally connected with a lower tax payment but also with higher tax-related 
planning costs. In contrast, the usage of a tax simplification option, like cash accounting or a 
lump-sum deduction for business expenses, generally reduces tax compliance costs. However 
its impact on the tax payment itself may be ambiguous. In summary, the effect of an 
unspecified tax option  k O  on the tax burden can be negative but also positive. The net income 
can be written as 
() ,, =− − − k YE T EC O C . (1) 
In the model we consider three different types of tax compliance costs. Personnel costs  p C  
result from personnel resources including the working effort of the entrepreneur  p R  deployed 
                                                 
2   According to the literature (inter alia Sandford et al. 1989, p. 12.) also the costs of tax planning are included.   5  
 
for bookkeeping, tax-filing, tax planning or other tax-related activities. Alternatively a 
business may substitute personnel resources by capital  c R  for tax administration hardware or 
software, with the costs  () cc CR. Furthermore, the taxpayer could also engage an external 
adviser to execute its tax administration obligations. The usage of external resources  e R  may 
be characterized as an outsourcing of tax administration and tax planning activities with the 
costs  () ee CR. For simplicity reasons we assume a constant market price  e p  for external 
advice, with  () ′ = ee e CR p . We take into account that complex and sophisticated activities 
should be executed at lower cost by a professional adviser. Hence, we assume the costs of in-
house tax compliance rising in the level of in-house compliance activities 
() () () 0, 0 ′′ ′′ >> pp cc CR CR . Based on these assumptions we should obtain an interior solution, 
with simple compliance activities being fulfilled in-house while complex problems are solved 
by an external adviser. Such a composition of different compliance strategies corresponds to 
the empirical evidence (inter alia OECD 2001, Kegels 2008).The total compliance burden C  
is defined as 
=++ pce CC CC . (3) 
The sum of resources spent on tax issues has to be sufficient to fulfil the amount of necessary 
compliance activities  A. Thus the maximisation of net income is restricted by an 
administration constraint. For simplicity we assume the production efficiency of external tax 
compliance to be one. The efficiency parameter of a personnel-intensive (capital-intensive) 
compliance strategy is denominated by θ  (ϖ ). We obtain 
() , θϖ =⋅ +⋅ + kp c e AEO R R R. (3) 
In accordance to the empirical literature (inter alia Tran-Nam et al. 2000) the total compliance 
burden  () , k AEO  is positively correlated with business size implying also a positive 
relationship with the pre-tax earnings ( ) 0 ∂ > ∂
A
E . Due to economies of scale the relative 
compliance cost burden decreases in pre-tax earnings ( )
2




. The amount of 
compliance activities  () , k A EO  may be further affected by specific tax options  k O . The sign 
of the derivative ∂
∂ k
A
O  can be positive or negative. In case of a tax simplification option (for 
example e-filing, simplified cash accounting) we assume a negative derivative  0 ∂ < ∂ k
A
O . In   6  
 
contrast, a planning option (for example income shifting from) requires planning costs and 
therefore implies a positive derivative  0 ∂ > ∂ k
A
O . The target function (1) and the tax 
administration constraint (3) can be integrated into the following lagrange function 
() ( ) ( ) ,, , λθ ϖ −− − − − − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − kp c e k p c e L=E T E C O C C C A E O R R R ,   (4) 
with λ  denoting the lagrange multiplier. 
For the earnings E , the usage of specific tax options  k O  and the different resources  p R ,  c R  
and  e R  we obtain as first order conditions 
0 λ ∂∂∂ −− ⋅= ∂∂∂
LTA =1 EEE , (5) 
() 10 λθ ∂∂ ′ −⋅ − + ⋅ = ∂∂ p
p
LT =C RC , (6) 
() 10 λϖ ∂∂ ′ −⋅ − + ⋅= ∂∂ c
c
LT =C RC , (7) 
() 10 λ ∂∂ −⋅ − + = ∂∂ e
e
LT =p RC , (8) 
0 λ ∂∂ ∂ −− ⋅≥ ∂∂ ∂ kk k
LT A = OO O . (9) 
Based on these conditions we can draw the following conclusions: 
1.  Condition (5) implies that tax compliance costs may be interpreted as part of the 
effective tax burden reducing the taxpayers’ ability to consume leisure or material 
goods. A rational decision maker considers tax compliance costs and c.p. tries to 
reduce its accordant burden. 
2.  In the optimum of an interior solution the gross marginal cost of in-house compliance 
per resource unit  ϖ θ
′ ′ =
p c C C  equals the external market price of outsourcing tax 
compliance activities  e p .
3 Under the conditions of rational choice a taxpayer thus 
chooses the cost-optimal mix of administration strategies. 
                                                 
3   For simplicity we assume that personnel costs, monetary in-house costs and external adviser costs are 
deductible with the same tax rate. Differences in the tax treatment of costs categories (for example for the 
working effort of the entrepreneur) could result in a preferential treatment of specific administration 
strategies.   7  
 
3.  Using (8) condition (9) can be converted to  ( ) 10 ∂∂ ∂ ⋅ −⋅+≤ ∂∂ ∂ e
kk
TA T p CO O . 
Hence, we can identify two different reasons for a rational taxpayer to choose a tax 
option  k O . A tax simplification option decreases the total compliance burden  A, 
while a tax planning option reduces the tax payment T . If these advantageous effects 
are not counterbalanced by a contradicting higher tax payment T  or by a higher 
compliance burden vice versa, a rational taxpayer selects the accordant option. 
 
3 Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data base 
We use German survey data relating the compliance costs of small and medium-sized 
enterprises to investigate the relationship of compliance costs and administration strategy. The 
data base has been raised in the year of 2003 by order of the German Ministry of Economics 
and Labour. It consists of 1,220 files and contains information about the costs of private 
businesses to comply with taxes, social insurance contributions, statistics as well as 
employment and environmental regulations (see Kayser et al. (2004) for further information). 
Due to missing values we have information on the overall compliance costs CC in 727 cases. 
Similar to OECD (2001) the tax-related costs TC and the social insurance-related costs SC are 
described by a fraction of the overall compliance costs CC. Except from the cost burden the 
record contains information on the dispersion on different cost categories (personnel costs PC 
including the labour costs of the entrepreneur, costs of external assistance EC and other 
monetary costs MC). Therefore, we may analyse the relationship between the cost structure 
and the cost burden. Also the time burden of the entrepreneur and the employees resulting 
from bureaucratic obligations is documented. In addition, the record includes the following 
details 
•  information on business size, location of the head office (state), legal form, age and 
industry, 
•  data on specific forms of employment (trainees, part-time employees, casualties, 
handicapped employees) and the fluctuation of employees, 
•  the accounting method that has been used for tax purposes, 
•  information on the usage and the accordant problems of an electronic data interchange 
with the financial and social insurance authorities (e-filing).   8  
 
Based on this information we can investigate the impact of cash accounting and e-filing on 
the compliance cost burden. In 2003 German businesses could choose to submit their tax 
returns and their monthly VAT statements electronically. In contrast, only small businesses 
and independent professions (lawyers, engineers, etc.) except from corporations could choose 
a simplified cash accounting method.  
To our assessment the record is the best data source available relating the compliance costs of 
small and medium-sized businesses in Germany. In spite of that there are some measurement 
issues that have to be taken into account. 
A basic problem of measuring compliance costs lies in the reliability of the taxpayers’ 
statements. As Tate (1988, p. 352) argues the respondents may overstate their compliance cost 
burden to impose pressure on the political authorities. On the other hand Klein-Blenkers 
(1980) and other authors find evidence for a cost perception deficit of taxpayers. According to 
that literature the respondents may underestimate their compliance costs because of 
disremembering parts of their cost burden.
4 In the survey data businesses had to declare the 
overall personnel costs, adviser costs and monetary costs without allocating them to specific 
activities. We may therefore assume that an overestimation due to political reasons should in 
part be counterbalanced by an underestimation due to a recall bias. 
Because of a low response rate of 7.7 % the empirical results could be affected by a non-
response bias. There are theoretical and empirical arguments for a positive as well as for a 
negative bias.
5 Therefore, the net effect of a selection bias on average compliance costs is 
unclear and could result in a “random noise”. A selection bias would not necessarily distort 
the regression results if it is not correlated to the investigated variables. Taking into account 
the small differences between the descriptive results of Kayser et al. (2004) and international 
studies (OECD 2001) a major distortion of the regression results by a selection bias seems 
unlikely. Nevertheless we made regressions for a number of target values to overcome the 
risk of possible measurement errors or a recall bias. 
                                                 
4   Klein-Blenkers (1980, p. 140) asked German enterprises for the sum of the overall compliance costs as well 
as for the sum of itemized cost elements. According to his findings the sum of overall compliance costs was 
considerably lower than the sum of itemized compliance costs. This can be taken as evidence for an 
underestimation of the sum of overall compliance costs. Similar results are reported by Rametse and Pope 
(2002) and Chittenden et al. (2005). These authors try to estimate the psychic costs of tax compliance by the 
difference of the sum of overall compliance costs and the sum of itemized cost elements. Contrasting Delgado 
et al. 2001 and other authors they find this difference in general to be negative. 
5  On the one hand taxpayers with high compliance costs may have an incentive to take part in empirical 
investigations to develop political pressure. On the other hand these taxpayers may be reluctant to participate 
in a survey because they do not like to waste their time. Empirical investigations find evidence for both 
arguments (Wicks 1965; Allers 1994 and Tran-Nam and Glover 2002).    9  
 
Table 1 contains the average values about the overall compliance costs (CC) of German 
businesses as well as the relative cost burden per associate (including the entrepreneur) and 
per turnover. 
Table 1 Absolute and relative compliance costs 
Number of associates  1 to 19  20 to 49  50 to 499  500 and more 
CC per business (€)  27,465  54,954  147,807  868,884 
CC per associate (€)  4,165  1,837  1,062  875 
CC per turnover (%)  3.97  2.09  1.03  0.36 
Cases 272  162  235  58 
 
Evidently the compliance cost burden rises with business size while the relative cost burden is 
remarkably higher for small businesses. Therefore, as has been stated in the literature (see 
Evans (2003) for a literature review) the compliance costs of taxation are mainly a problem 
for small businesses and self-employed people. The following chart documents the share of 
compliance costs being caused by taxes and social insurances for employees. 
Table 2 Tax and social insurance compliance costs 
Number of associates  1 to 19  20 to 49  50 to 499  500 and more 
Share of TC (%)  51.66  47.96  44.38  33.21 
Share of SC (%)  27.83  29.37  29.48  28.12 
Overall share (%)  79.49  77.33  73.86  61.33 
 
In accordance to the empirical literature (inter alia OECD 2001) the impact of tax-related 
activities on the overall compliance cost burden is strong. Including payroll taxes and social 
insurance payments, on average about 74% of all compliance costs result from taxes and 
duties. The relevance of taxes is considerably higher for small businesses. The total 
compliance costs CC are composed by fractions of personnel costs PC (including the 
compliance work of the entrepreneur), external costs EC and other material costs MC 
documented in the following table. 
 
   10  
 
Table 3 Compliance cost categories 
Number of associates  1 to 19  20 to 49  50 to 499  500 and more 
Share of PC (%)  52.04  54.69  54.71  51.56 
Share of EC (%)  37.76  33.80  32.10  31.34 
Share of MC (%)  10.20  11.51  13.19  17.10 
Total (%)  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
 
Apparently small businesses rely more heavily on external support than medium-sized 
businesses, while their share in other monetary expenses is lower. This finding can be 
explained by economies of scale favoring a capital-intensive business strategy for bigger 
businesses. The share of personnel costs is rather constant but consists in the smallest size 
classes mainly of the labour costs of the entrepreneur. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses and estimation strategy 
As has been elucidated before, a rational decision maker c.p. chooses a cost-optimal business 
administration strategy depending on the firms’ characteristics. Therefore, the outsourcing of 
administrative obligations to tax advisers and other contractors should not have a significant 
influence on the tax-related compliance costs of private businesses as long as the equation 
controls for the cost-relevant characteristics of the firm (see also Hudson and Godwin 2000). 
In contrast, the analytical model suggests a rational decision maker to select a tax 
simplification option if a reduction of compliance costs is not counterbalanced by a higher tax 
payment. Hence, we expect the compliance costs of private businesses choosing a 
simplification option like cash accounting to be significantly lower. 
According to this argumentation we deploy the following hypotheses for our quantitative 
analysis: 
1.  The degree of outsourcing tax-related administration to external advisers has no 
significant impact on the tax-related compliance costs in the data set. 
2.  Also the weight of a capital-intensive administration strategy does not significantly 
affect the compliance cost burden.   11  
 
3.  Businesses using an electronic data interchange with the financial or the social 
insurance authorities bear a significantly lower cost burden unless they report 
problems related to this subject. 
4.  Businesses using a simplified cash accounting method have significantly lower tax-
related compliance costs. 
Corresponding to the literature (inter alia Verwaal 2000; Hudson and Godwin (2000); 
Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002) we use a logarithmic linear model to estimate the relationship 
between administration strategy and tax compliance costs. Furthermore, we include the 
following procedures to enhance our regression results: 
•  In contrast to previous studies we measure the applied administration strategy not only 
by a dummy variable (for example paid preparers) but more precisely by the share of 
external costs and internal monetary costs at the overall compliance cost burden CC. 
•  As has been exemplified especially high or low cost burdens may be caused by 
overestimations or underestimations of the respondents and could bias the regression 
results. For that reason we exclude cases with the residuals of a size-based estimation 
exceeding the double of the accordant standard deviation.
6 
•  There may be measurement errors related to overall compliance costs as well as to the 
share of tax-related and social insurance-related costs. Therefore, we estimate all 
regressions for overall costs CC, tax-related costs TC and social insurance-related 
costs SC. Moreover, we recalculated the personnel costs by the product of working 




The logarithmic GLS model can be written as: 
01 2 3 4 5
67 8 9 1 0
α αα α α α
αα αα α ε
=+ ⋅ +⋅ +⋅ +⋅ +⋅
+⋅ +⋅ +⋅ +⋅ + ⋅+
CCost Size Employment Outsourcing Capitalintensive EDIF
EDIFP EDIS EDISP Cashaccounting X
(8) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
                                                 
6   The outlier correction is explained in more detail in appendix 6.1. 
7   These results are documented in appendix 6.4.   12  
 
CCost   Natural logarithm of the overall compliance costs CC, the tax-related 
costs TC or the social insurance-related costs SC
8 
Size  Business size is measured as natural logarithm of turnover (for TC and 
CC) or associates (for SC) amplified by 1.
9 
Employment   As previous studies documented the compliance cost level increases 
significantly if a business has to pay wage taxes and payroll taxes for its 
employees (Hudson and Godwin 2000). Therefore, we deploy a dummy 
variable for businesses with two and more associates assuming the first 
associate to be the entrepreneur. 
Outsourcing   An outsourcing-oriented administration strategy is measured as the 
natural logarithm of external costs EC per overall compliance costs CC 
amplified by 1%.
10 
Capitalintensive  A capital-intensive administration strategy is measured as the natural 
logarithm of material costs MC per overall compliance costs CC 
amplified by 1%. 
EDIF   Dummy for businesses using an electronic data interchange with the tax 
authorities 
EDIFP  Dummy for businesses reporting problems regarding the electronic data 
interchange with the tax authorities 
EDIS   Dummy for businesses using an electronic data interchange with the 
social insurance authorities 
EDISP   Dummy for businesses reporting problems regarding the electronic data 
interchange with the social insurance the authorities 
Cashaccounting   Dummy for businesses relying on a simplified cash accounting method 
for tax purposes 
X    Vector of control variables
 11 
ε    Interference  factor 
 
Similar to Hudson and Godwin (2000) we observe heteroscedasticity being related to the size 
of the responding businesses. Therefore, we deployed a WLS regression, with the natural 
logarithm of turnover amplified by 1 as weighting factor. This procedure ensures the Gauß-
Markov theorem.
12 In accordance to Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) we excluded missing 
                                                 
8   To consider cases without costs of social insurance and wage taxation (Employment variable) SC is amplified 
by 1 before the application of the natural logarithm. In contrast, zero values for CC and TC are neglected. 
9   The associate number is connected more directly to the costs of wage and payroll taxation. In contrast, the 
turnover has a higher explanatory power for models of CC and TC. In any case the size measure is amplified 
by 1 to prevent undefined logarithmic values. 
10  This is to prevent undefined logarithmic values. An amplification of the share by 1 (100 %) would result in 
biased regression results. 
11  See appendix 6.3 for a detailed list of these variables. 
12  Appendix 6.2 elucidates the estimation requirements including the problem of heteroscedasticity.   13  
 
values from the analysis to prevent imputation problems. Therefore, we estimate tax-related 
compliance costs only for cases comprehending information on personnel costs PC, external 
costs EC, other monetary costs MC and the share of tax-related costs. 
 
3.3 Regression results 
Previous studies document the remarkable impact of business size on absolute compliance 
costs as well as on relative compliance costs (per associate or per turnover). Therefore, an 
univariate analysis is not assessed as appropriate. However a consideration of all available 
control variables results in a loss of information due to missing values. For that reason we 
estimate the regressions for a simplified S model excluding the vector of further influence 
factors X and an extended E model including vector X. The following table documents the 
coefficients and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the whole data set excluding 
outliers.
13 In the models for the tax-related (TC) and social insurance-related (SC) compliance 
costs only an electronic interchange with the accordant authorities is recognised. The cash 
accounting method is neglected in the models for SC. 
Table 4 Regression results for the whole data set 
Target variable   CC (S model)   CC (E model)   TC (S model)   TC (E model)   SC (S model)   SC (E model) 
Size   0.389*** (0.020)   0.360*** (0.033)   0.344*** (0.022)   0.333*** (0.029)   0.419*** (0.031)   0.349*** (0.046) 
Employment   0.114     (0.299)   0.149     (0.382)  -0.294     (0.328)  -0.370     (0.335)   6.659*** (0.487)   5.892*** (0.585) 
Outsourcing -0.273***  (0.049)  -0.283*** (0.056)  -0.255*** (0.055)  -0.233*** (0.058)  -0.410*** (0.061)  -0.428*** (0.069) 
Capitalintensive  -0.069     (0.049)  -0.050     (0.056)  -0.096*    (0.055)  -0.083     (0.058)  -0.005     (0.064)   0.027     (0.070) 
EDIF    0.152     (0.115)   0.114     (0.131)  -0.009      (0.105)  -0.024      (0.109)  -  - 
EDIFP  -0.086     (0.224)  -0.049     (0.283)   0.129      (0.203)   0.175      (0.212)  -  - 
EDIS  -0.062     (0.100)  -0.089     (0.116)  -  -   0.023      (0.107)   -0.014     (0.121) 
EDISP   0.074     (0.182)   0.015     (0.207)  -  -   0.002      (0.188)   -0.134     (0.207) 
Cashaccounting  -0.246     (0.243)  -0.321     (0.349)  -0.226     (0.272)  -0.292     (0.310)  -  - 
Constant   3.919*** (0.427)   2.937*** (0.731)   4.026*** (0.475)   4.080*** (0.552)   0.461      (0.519)   0.124      (0.843) 
R
2 (corrected)   0.447   0.410   0.341   0.347   0.467   0.455 
Cases   654   511   603   571   631   505 
 
Corresponding to previous studies (inter alia Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002) we find business 
size to be the most important influence factor for the compliance costs of taxes and social 
                                                 
13  The complete regression results including the variables of the vector X as well as the variance inflation factors 
are reported by appendix 6.3.   14  
 
insurance payments. A growth in business size by 1% leads to a growth of compliance costs 
between 0.344% to 0.419%. The correlation coefficient <1 exemplifies the existence of 
economies of scale within the administration process. Furthermore, the high value of the 
constant indicates fixed cost elements. In the SC model this fixed cost effect is captured by 
the Employment variable. 
In contrast to our hypothesis 1 we find a significant and negative relationship between 
compliance costs and the outsourcing of compliance activities to external contractors. The 
correlation coefficient fluctuates between –0.233 (extended TC model) and –0.428 (extended 
SC model). Hence, doubling the share of outsourced compliance activities (for example from 
20% to 40%) on average reduces the accordant compliance cost burden by 14.4% to 24.9%. 
The effect is stronger for the social insurance-related compliance costs and remains robust for 
all estimated models.
14  
There is no similar impact for the usage of a capital-intensive compliance strategy. Only in 
the S model for CC we find a negative correlation that is barely significant. Thus hypothesis 2 
is supported by the empirical results. 
As well we do not find a significant relationship between the compliance burden and an 
electronic data interchange with the tax or social insurance authorities. Furthermore, there is 
no significant effect for businesses reporting problems related to an electronic data 
interchange. Moreover and in spite of a negative correlation coefficient for Cashaccounting  
we can also not approve businesses using this simplified accounting method to bear a 
significantly lower cost burden. These results are robust for all applied models. 
Correspondingly the hypotheses 3 and 4 are not confirmed by our regressions. 
An administration strategy may have a different impact on small businesses compared to 
medium and big businesses. To account for this fact we made separate regressions
15 for small 
businesses with less than 50 associates (including the entrepreneur) and medium and big 
businesses.
16 Table 5 documents the regression results for small businesses supporting our 
findings for the whole data set. Except from the models for SC the outsourcing effect on the 
compliance cost burden is even stronger than in the overall sample. 
                                                 
14  A possible explanation for this result could be an overestimation of in-house labour costs within our data set. 
To account for that we recalculated the personnel costs of compliance by the product of the working hours 
and the average labour costs. The accordant regressions in appendix 6.4 support our results. 
15  An alternative approach would be to include combination terms of the independent variables and business 
size. We abstained from that approach because of multicollinearity problems. 
16  We use the small business criterion of the Commission of the European Communities (2003). Due to the 
limited number of big businesses in the data set it did not seem to be appropriate to make a separate regression 
for this group.   15  
 
Table 5 Regression results for small businesses 
Target variable   CC (S model)   CC (E model)   TC (S model)   TC (E model)   SC (S model)   SC (E model) 
Size   0.364*** (0.039)   0.302*** (0.052)   0.305*** (0.042)   0.286*** (0.050)   0.528*** (0.077)   0.422*** (0.104) 
Employment   0.197     (0.264)   0.202     (0.347)  -0.204     (0.292)  -0.228     (0.304)   6.569*** (0.451)   5.986*** (0.558) 
Outsourcing -0.314***  (0.056)  -0.367*** (0.066)  -0.301*** (0.064)  -0.288*** (0.067)  -0.344*** (0.073)  -0.404*** (0.085) 
Capitalintensive  -0.093*    (0.056)  -0.033     (0.067)  -0.104     (0.064)  -0.074     (0.068)  -0.075     (0.076)  -0.034     (0.085) 
EDIF    0.128     (0.143)   0.140     (0.162)  -0.078     (0.122)  -0.111     (0.128)  -  - 
EDIFP  -0.016     (0.281)  -0.032     (0.376)   0.266     (0.271)   0.367     (0.284)  -  - 
EDIS  -0.178     (0.133)  -0.320**  (0.159)  -  -  -0.114      (0.134)  -0.233      (0.160) 
EDISP  -0.075     (0.248)  -0.205     (0.283)  -  -  -0.175      (0.273)  -0.493      (0.306) 
Cashaccounting  -0.333     (0.217)  -0.275     (0.312)  -0.331     (0.246)  -0.204     (0.284)  -  - 
Constant   4.150*** (0.585)   4.191*** (0.967)   4.468*** (0.674)   4.779*** (0.778)   0.254      (0.488)   0.567      (0.916) 
R
2 (corrected)   0.294   0.296   0.202   0.208   0.509   0.488 
Cases   400   301   372   355   381   292 
 
Table 6 contains the regression results for the medium and big enterprises. Because all these 
businesses have employees the variable Employment  is neglected. We find similar results 
compared to the previous models but the effect of outsourcing tax administration is weaker 
and not significant in all cases. Therefore, we can remark the cost-reducing effect of 
outsourcing administration activities to arise especially in the case of small businesses. 
Table 6 Regression results for medium and big businesses 
Target variable   CC (S model)   CC (E model)   TC (S model)   TC (E model)   SC (S model)   SC (E model) 
Size   0.419*** (0.040)   0,388*** (0.071)   0.407*** (0.047)   0.415*** (0,060)   0.446*** (0.072)   0.361*** (0.097) 
Outsourcing  -0.234**  (0.090)  -0.230**  (0.106)  -0.197**  (0.099)  -0.167     (0.110) -0.505***  (0.107) -0.480***  (0.121) 
Capitalintensive  -0.018     (0.088)  -0.022     (0.107)  -0.077     (0.100)  -0.084     (0.108)   0.093     (0.111)   0.148     (0.127) 
EDIF    0.214     (0.195)   0.062     (0.232)   0.079     (0.187)   0.113     (0.208)  -  - 
EDIFP  -0.184     (0.369)  -0.005     (0.486)  -0.038     (0.322)  -0.101     (0.363)  -  - 
EDIS   0.083     (0.160)   0.259     (0.201)  -  -   0.225     (0.178)   0.302     (0.205) 
EDISP   0.108     (0.283)   0.000     (0.337)  -  -   0.052     (0.277)  -0.059     (0.309) 
Constant   3.600*** (0.750)   1.937     (1.279)   2.735*** (0.867)   1.985*    (1.074)   6.913*** (0.492)   4.434*** (1.098) 
R
2 (corrected)   0.318   0.270   0.253   0.237   0.222   0.250 
Cases   253   209   230   215   249   212 
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4 Interpretations 
In the empirical analysis we found strong evidence for businesses relying heavily on external 
support to have lower compliance costs due to taxes and social insurance contributions. This 
outcome contradicts our hypothesis of businesses in general choosing a cost-optimal 
compliance strategy. Presumably this observation is not caused by a lower quality of the 
“outputs” like the tax return.
17 In the following section we discuss alternative approaches to 
explain this “irrational” decision making behaviour. 
Koellinger et al. (2007) give empirical evidence for overconfidence of self-employed 
entrepreneurs. From a decision making perspective a systematic overestimation of the 
businesses’ capabilities results in higher presumed efficiency parameters θ  and ϖ  of the in-
house compliance strategies. This implies a bias in decision making as well as an insufficient 
usage of external advice. 
In a dynamic environment we would expect businesses to correct the misevaluation of their 
own capabilities by learning behaviour if they are able to control for the cost-efficient 
strategy. As the empirical literature substantiates (inter alia Klein-Blenkers 1980), there is 
evidence on a deficit of taxpayers to percept their compliance cost burden. The oblivion of 
past compliance activities could distort the choice between the underestimated in-house tax 
compliance costs and the well-known costs of an external tax adviser.
18 In an analytical 
notation this aspect can be documented by a cost perception parameter  1 ξ < . The criterion of 
a perceived cost optimum converts to  ϖ θξ
′ ′ ==
p ce C Cp . A similar explanation would be an 
insufficient perception of the tax-deductibility of tax adviser costs. If adviser costs are 
compared with the compliance performance of the entrepreneur, this could result in an 
overestimation of net tax adviser costs. Inter alia Boylan and Frischmann (2007) find 
empirical evidence for a misperception of marginal tax rates by taxpayers.  
A rational choice argument for the insufficient use of external advice lies in the limited degree 
small businesses comply with the tax law (Rice 1992; Slemrod et al. 2001). According to 
Erard and Ho (2003) the non-compliance of businesses is negatively correlated with the 
existence of external confidents. From this perspective there is an incentive for a non-
compliant taxpayer to administer its tax affairs without the support of an external adviser. 
                                                 
17  Due to the experience and the accountability of tax advisers it does not seem to be probable that outsourced 
tax returns or financial statements have a lower quality than tax returns produced in-house. Bloomquist et al. 
(2007) do not find a higher failure rate for U.S. tax returns prepared by tax advisers. 
18  A similar argument is applied by Glaser and Weber (2007) to explain the lack of learning behaviour within 
the portfolio investment decisions of private investors.   17  
 
Furthermore, the information asymmetry between taxpayer and tax adviser may be a reason to 
abdicate external advice. Due to mistrust in the tax adviser the taxpayer could try to keep at 
least some control over its tax affairs. 
In case of capital-intensive compliance strategies we do not find evidence for cost-
inefficiencies. Hence, we may assume that German businesses use capital-intensive 
instruments like tax administration hardware and software to an adequate extent. In contrast to 
our hypotheses we also do not find significant support for a cost-reduction by the choice of a 
simplified cash accounting method or of an electronic data interchange with the authorities. In 
case of an electronic data interchange this result may be caused by the fact that the first 
projects of e-filing tax-relevant information to German tax authorities started in 1999. 
Therefore, potential cost reductions could have been contradicted by start-up costs. In terms 
of simplified cash accounting we find constantly negative correlation coefficients but also 
high standard errors. A possible explanation could be that a significant part of the respondents 
had also to prepare commercial balance sheets for business law reasons. Hence, the additional 
costs for preparing a tax balance sheet on the basis of a commercial balance sheet could be 
comparable to the costs of preparing a cash-based balance sheet for tax reasons. Besides, the 
cash accounting method could have been chosen for tax planning reasons in some cases. For 
that reasons the insignificance of cash accounting or an electronic data interchange with the 
tax and social insurance authorities should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless the 
regression results give cause for concern about the amount of possible cost reductions due to 
e-filing and cash based accounting for the single taxpayer or the economy as a whole. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we analysed the relationship between tax compliance costs and business strategy. 
Using an analytical model of rational choice it can be postulated that taxpayers choose a cost-
optimal compliance strategy. We applied a German data set of 1,220 especially small and 
medium-sized businesses to investigate this hypothesis in an econometric WLS model. 
Partially in contrast to the literature we found evidence that outsourcing tax compliance 
activities to external advisers may be an appropriate strategy to reduce the compliance cost 
burden especially of small businesses. The result can be interpreted as a hint for the usage of 
cost-inefficient compliance strategies.  
We find no similar cost-reducing effect for capital-intensive compliance strategies (for 
example the use of tax administration software), an electronic data interchange with the tax   18  
 
and social insurance authorities or a simplified cash accounting method for tax purposes. The 
insignificance of electronic submission methods may be caused by start-up costs 
counterbalancing potential cost reductions. 
An explanation for the cost-inefficient compliance behaviour especially of small businesses 
could be an overconfidence of private businessmen relating their own tax administration 
capabilities. Taking into account empirical evidence on a deficit in the perception of tax 
compliance costs there could be also a biased decision due to neglecting in-house compliance 
activities. Further motivations for a cost-inefficient degree of outsourcing could be mistrust to 
the tax adviser or the avoidance of a confident for a partially noncompliant behaviour. 
Our findings suggest that promoting paid preparation could be an appropriate strategy to 
reduce the tax compliance burden especially of small businesses. Therefore, the costs of 
external tax advice should be tax-deductable and government authorities should support the 
relationship between external tax advisers and private businesses. Taking into account the 
findings of Erard and Ho (2003) about non-compliant taxpayer behaviour the growing 
importance of external tax advice could also have a share in reducing tax evasion. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Outlier correction and missing values 
We use a size-specific regression of the form  01 2 α αα ε = +⋅ + ⋅+ CCost Size X  to exclude 
outliers from our original data set. Taking into account also the fixed costs of SC resulting 
from employment, we apply the following parameters in our regression: 
•  TC and CC: Size measured as the natural logarithm of the turnover amplified by 1. No 
further independent variables are deployed. X is defined as zero. 
•  SC: Size measured as the natural logarithm of the number of associates amplified by 1. 
A dummy variable for Employment  is considered as vector X. 
In case of the TC and CC models we observe heteroscedasticity of the residuals in relation to 
business size. Therefore, in these models we use an estimator weighted by the accordant 
parameter for Size (natural logarithm of the turnover amplified by 1). We exclude all cases 
with the residuals exceeding the double average standard deviation (33 cases for CC, 39 cases 
for TC and 22 cases for SC). 
Missing values are eliminated listwise to prevent possible problems of imputation methods. A 
disadvantage of this approach lies in the fact that the size of the relevant data set is negatively 
correlated with the number of independent variables. The following tables document the 
descriptive statistics of the data set excluding outliers and missing values related to 
compliance costs or business size. Evidently the average values of compliance costs are lower 
than in the unadjusted data set. That holds especially for the bigger size classes. 
Table A1 Compliance costs (outliers and missings excluded) 
Number of associates  1 to 19  20 to 49  50 to 499  500 and more 
CC per business (€)  26,033  49,125  88,588  384,951 
CC per associate (€)  3,730  1,657  786  305 
CC per turnover (%)  3.68  1.76  0.77  0.21 
Cases 252  152  209  46 
 
The composition of CC is described by the tables A2 and A3. Except from the biggest size 
class, the share of tax-related is lower than in the original sample. In case of the cost   20  
 
categories we find no considerable derivations from the results of the overall data set 
(including outliers and missing values). 
Table A2 SC and TC (outliers and missings excluded) 
Number of associates  1 to 19  20 to 49  50 to 499  500 and more 
Share of TC (%)  49.25  40.07  37.37  37.12 
Share of SC (%)  27.41  32.72  30.41  27.11 
Total share (%)  76.66  72.79  67.78  64.23 
 
Table A3 Cost categories (outliers and missings excluded) 
Number of associates  1 to 19  20 to 49  50 to 499  500 and more 
Share of PC (%)  51.41  53.98  54.32  49.57 
Share of EC (%)  38.37  34.54  32.74  33.74 
Share of MC (%)  10.22  11.48  12.94  16.69 
Total (%)  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
 
6.2 Analysis of the residuals 
According to the Gauß-Markov theorem a OLS regression requires a linear model, an 
expected value for the interference factor of zero, the absence of multicollinearity as well as a 
homoscedasticic distribution of the residuals. Our model application satisfies the first three 
conditions,
19 but violates the assumption of homoscedasticity. Table A4 contains the results of 
a Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan 1979) for a size-based OLS regression. We consider 
the same parameters as in Appendix 6.1. 
Table A4 Breusch-Pagan results 
Model  CC (turnover)  CC (associates)  TC (turnover)  TC (associates)  SC (turnover)  SC (associates) 
R
2 (corrected)    0.038    0.028    0.041    0.031    0.016  0.012 
F values  26.887  20.081  27.319 20.595  11.476 9.052 
t values    5.185    4.481    5.227    4.538    3.388    3.009 
                                                 
19  The satisfaction of the first and the second condition results from the linear model considering a constant 
factor. The existence of multicollinearity can be investigated by variance inflation factors (VIF). Appendix 
6.3 presents the VIF values for the extended models. We find no empirical support for the thesis that 
multicollinearity is a serious problem.   21  
 
We find evidence for a significant (99% level) and positive correlation of business size and 
the estimated residuals. Besides the F and t-values are considerably higher for the models 
based on turnover. Hence, we use a WLS model based on the natural logarithm of the 
turnover amplified by 1 for our further econometric analysis. 
For our regressions we apply the t-test to control for the significance of the correlation 
coefficients. The test demands normality of the regression residuals. The following table 
reports the Kolmogorov-Smirnov results of normality for the residuals of the estimated 
models. The hypothesis of normality cannot be refused. 
Table A5 Kolmogorov-Smirnov results 
Model  CC (S model)  CC (E model)  TC (S model)  TC (E model)  SC (S model)  SC (E model) 
Overall sample  1.100 (0.178)  1.148 (0.143)  1.168 (0,130) 0.764  (0.603) 1.172 (0.128)  1.203 (0.111) 
Small businesses  1.127 (0.158)  0.743 (0.639)  1.196 (0.114)  0.955 (0.322)  1.127 (0.158)  0.743 (0.639) 
Medium and big  0.789 (0.562)  0.493 (0.968)  0.809 (0,529) 0.476  (0.977) 0.636 (0.814)  0.733 (0.656) 
Average personnel 
costs 
0.890 (0.407)  0.680 (0.745)  0.777 (0.582)  0.723 (0.673)  1.005 (0.265)  0.847 (0.470) 
Average labour 
costs (2003) 
0.915 (0.373)  0.804 (0.537)  0.847 (0.470)  0.862 (0.447)  0.917 (0.370)  0.969 (0.305) 
 
6.3 Complete results of the extended regression models 
Within our paper we use the vector X to control for further control variables. The variables 
covered by X are described by the following list: 
 
Age   Age of the businesses raised by 1: the variable accounts for possible 
start-up costs of young businesses that have been documented by 
Hansford et al. (2003). 
Industry  Dummy variables for industry including traders,  manufacturing 
businesses,  building businesses,  business service enterprises,  other 
service enterprises. An explicit variable for building businesses is 
neglected to prevent multicollinearity. Besides we consider dummies 
for handicrafts, and independent professions.  
Legal form    Dummy variables for legal form including individual enterprises, 
partnerships, companies and a specific combination of partnership and 
company (GmbH & Co. KG). An explicit variable for companies is 
neglected to prevent multicollinearity. Because the legal form of a 
business has no considerable effect on the payroll obligations of the 
employees we neglected these variables in the models for social 
insurance-related compliance costs.   22  
 
State  Dummy variables for the state of the business headquarter location 
including  Baden-Württemberg,  Bayern, Berlin,  Brandenburg, 
Hamburg,  Hessen,  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,  Niedersachsen, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen,  Rheinland-Pfalz,  Sachsen,  Sachsen-Anhalt, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Thüringen. Bremen and Saarland are ignored 
due to limited data. An explicit variable for Bayern is neglected to 
prevent multicollinearity. 
 
The variables beneath account for specific effects of the wage and payroll taxation. They are 
neglected in the models for tax-related compliance costs TC: 
 
Part time  Natural logarithm of the fraction of part-time employees to all 
associates amplified by 1% 
Casuals   Natural logarithm of the fraction of casual employees to all associates 
amplified by 1% 
Trainees   Natural logarithm of the fraction of trainees to all associates amplified 
by 1% 
Disabled   Natural logarithm of the fraction of disabled employees to all associates 
amplified by 1% 
Fluctuation  Dummy variable accounting for the fluctuation in the employee 
number: it takes a value of 1 if the number of employees has grown or 
decreased in the last three years. 
Foreigners  Dummy variable for businesses “feeling” burdened by the employment 
of foreigners: it is expected that a felt burden results from specific 
obligations of wage and payroll taxes of foreigners. 
 
The following table A6 describes the overall results for the extended regression models 
including the standard errors (in parentheses). Because of the fact that the risk of 
multicollinearity rises with the number of considered variables it further contains the variance 
inflation factor [in parentheses]. We find no empirical support for the thesis that 
multicollinearity is a serious problem. 
Table A6 Complete regression results for overall data set 
Target variable  CC  TC  SC 
Size   0.360*** (0.033) [2.176]   0.333*** (0.029) [1.921]   0.349*** (0.046) [1.889] 
Employment   0.149     (0.382) [1.554]  -0.370     (0.335) [1.292]   5.892*** (0.585) [1.136] 
Outsourcing  -0.283*** (0.056) [1.069]  -0.233*** (0.058) [1.043]  -0.428*** (0.069) [1.076] 
Capitalintensive  -0.050     (0.056) [1.149]  -0.083     (0.058) [1.114]   0.027     (0.070) [1.100]   23  
 
EDIF    0.114     (0.131) [1.808]  -0.024     (0.109) [1.263]  - 
EDIFP  -0.049     (0.283) [1.798]   0.175     (0.212) [1.287]  - 
EDIS  -0.089     (0.116) [1.918]  -   -0.014     (0.121) [1.310] 
EDISP   0.015     (0.207) [1.773]  -   -0.134     (0.207) [1.237] 
Cashaccounting  -0.321     (0.349) [1.645]  -0.292     (0.310) [1.559]  - 
Age   0.135*** (0.052) [1.717]   0.043     (0.046) [1.599]   0.161*** (0,062) [1.547] 
Trader   0.128     (0.152) [1.930]   0.146     (0.145) [1.720]   0.238     (0.189) [1.864] 
Manufacturing business   0.153     (0.131) [1.622]   0.150     (0.135) [1.533]   0.114     (0.162) [1.758] 
Business services   0.342**  (0.152) [1.789]   0.354**  (0.150) [1.746]   0.313     (0.195) [1.758] 
Other services   0.404*** (0.145) [2.183]   0.153     (0.143) [2.062]   0.440**  (0.184) [2.176] 
Handicraft   0.074     (0.114) [1.912]   0.092     (0.115) [1.858]  -0.018     (0.142) [1.858] 
Independent profession  -0.097     (0.120) [1.456]  -0.023    (0.120) [1.517]  -0.184     (0.152) [1.489] 
Individual enterprise  -0.012     (0.159) [1.384]   0.037    (0.162) [1.414]  - 
Partnership   0.117     (0.188) [1.123]   0.075     (0.186) [1.098]  - 
GmbH & Co. KG  -0.066     (0.133) [1.228]   0.021     (0.141) [1.193]  - 
Baden-Württemberg  -0.022     (0.150) [1.452]  -0,062     (0.154) [1.424]  -0.027     (0.186) [1.427] 
Berlin   0.158     (0.219) [1.212]   0.073     (0.221) [1.204]   0.148     (0.278) [1.188] 
Brandenburg  -0.075     (0.251) [1.189]  -0.199     (0.245) [1.166]   0.040     (0.335) [1.163] 
Hamburg   0.009     (0.265) [1.171]  -0.075     (0.233) [1.899]   0.292     (0.340) [1.155] 
Hessen  -0.152     (0.228) [1.182]  -0.490**  (0.226) [1.169]  -0,056     (0.269) [1.198] 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern   0.335     (0.240) [1.212]   0.108     (0.253) [1.172]   0.252     (0.310) [1.197] 
Niedersachsen   0.024     (0.165) [1.348]  -0.314*   (0.169) [1.342]   0.066     (0.207) [1.331] 
Nordrhein-Westfalen   0.177     (0.128) [1.604]   0.007     (0.130) [1.582]   0.271*   (0.160) [1.584] 
Rheinland-Pfalz   0.452     (0.277) [1.136]   0.203     (0.295) [1.105]   0.418     (0.344) [1.103] 
Sachsen  -0.191     (0.196) [1.257]  -0.381**  (0.193) [1.267]  -0.351     (0.248) [1.234] 
Sachsen-Anhalt   0.214     (0.237) [1.189]  -0.346     (0.246) [1.165]   0.251     (0.292) [1.188] 
Schleswig-Holstein   0.056     (0.239) [1.177]  -0.201     (0.259) [1.132]   0.249     (0.322) [1.141] 
Thüringen   0.268     (0.264) [1.168]  -0.267     (0.246) [1.196]  -0.021     (0.349) [1.136] 
Casuals  -0.044     (0.034) [1.236]  -  -0.060     (0.041) [1.134] 
Disabled  -0.082     (0.059) [1.236]  -  -0.092     (0.074) [1.244] 
Part time  -0.021     (0.036) [1.333]  -  -0.041     (0.044) [1.297] 
Trainees  -0.029     (0.040) [1.292]  -   0.033     (0.050) [1.256] 
Foreigners   0.080     (0.093) [1.233]  -   0.144     (0.118) [1.218]  
Fluctuation   0.094     (0.093) [1.114]  -   0.340*** (0.119) [1.086] 
Constant   2.937*** (0.731)   4.080*** (0.552)   0.124      (0.843) 
R
2 (corrected)   0.410   0.347   0.455 
Cases 511 571 505 
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Table A7 describes the complete regression results for small businesses including standard 
deviations (in parentheses) and variance inflation factors [in parentheses]. 
Table A7 Complete regression results for small businesses 
Target variable  CC  TC  SC 
Size   0.302*** (0.052) [1.905]   0.286*** (0.050) [1.785]   0.422*** (0.104) [1.598] 
Employment   0.202     (0.347) [1.765]  -0.228     (0.304) [1.379]   5.986*** (0.558) [1.320] 
Outsourcing  -0.367*** (0.066) [1.176]  -0.288*** (0.067) [1.069]  -0.404*** (0.085) [1.196] 
Capitalintensive  -0.033     (0.067) [1.246]  -0.074     (0.068) [1.123]  -0.034     (0.085) [1.131] 
EDIF    0.140     (0.162) [2.050]  -0.111     (0.128) [1.252]  - 
EDIFP  -0.032     (0.376) [1.726]   0.367     (0.284) [1.283]  - 
EDIS -0.320**    (0.159) [2.432]  -  -0.233      (0.160) [1.405] 
EDISP  -0.205     (0.283) [1.759]  -  -0.493      (0.306) [1.278] 
Cashaccounting  -0.275     (0.312) [1.809]  -0.204     (0.284) [1.690]  - 
Age   0.132**  (0.058) [1.362]   0.036     (0.051) [1.280]   0.105     (0,074) [1.258] 
Trader   0.081     (0.168) [1.934]   0.170     (0.167) [1.773]   0.118     (0.222) [1.958] 
Manufacturing business   0.076     (0.158) [1.631]   0.061     (0.162) [1.467]  -0.103     (0.206) [1.599] 
Business services   0.322*    (0.175) [2.082]   0.394**  (0.174) [2.037]   0.254     (0.232) [2.049] 
Other services   0.253     (0.171) [2.430]   0.083     (0.168) [2.272]   0.274     (0.226) [2.311] 
Handicraft   0.004     (0.144) [2.334]   0.010     (0.143) [2.226]  -0.112     (0.187) [2.218] 
Independent profession  -0.144     (0.128) [1.505]  -0.178     (0.133) [1.655]  -0.243     (0.169) [1.525] 
Individual enterprise  -0.207     (0.157) [1.512]  -0.165     (0.160) [1.515]  - 
Partnership  -0.150     (0.217) [1.196]  -0.054     (0.229) [1.136]  - 
GmbH & Co. KG  -0.134     (0.203) [1.229]  -0.021     (0.213) [1.175]  - 
Baden-Württemberg  -0.022     (0.150) [1.452]   0,047     (0.185) [1.445]   0.273     (0..237) [1.388] 
Berlin   0.074     (0.229) [1.282]   0.024     (0.230) [1.258]  -0.032     (0.303) [1.250] 
Brandenburg  -0.209     (0.307) [1.244]  -0.272     (0.259) [1.177]  -0.269     (0.400) [1.222] 
Hamburg  -0.331     (0.335) [1.178]  -0.073     (0.294) [1.236]   0.038     (0.458) [1.136] 
Hessen  -0.174     (0.261) [1.213]  -0.507*    (0.262) [1.176]  -0,121     (0.320) [1.225] 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern   0.054     (0.256) [1.263]  -0.005     (0.264) [1.201]  -0.135     (0.337) [1.270] 
Niedersachsen  -0.136     (0.215) [1.322]  -0.434**  (0.218) [1.296]  -0.054     (0.284) [1.279] 
Nordrhein-Westfalen   0.067     (0.150) [1.601]  -0.070     (0.154) [1.548]   0.072     (0.198) [1.571] 
Rheinland-Pfalz   0.327     (0.281) [1.193]   0.089     (0.304) [1.136]   0.453     (0.382) [1.150] 
Sachsen  -0.340     (0.210) [1.346]  -0.386*   (0.210) [1.306]  -0.454*    (0.275) [1.290] 
Sachsen-Anhalt   0.483*    (0.255) [1.232]  -0.155     (0.266) [1.176]   0.581*    (0.321) [1.212] 
Schleswig-Holstein   0.098     (0.271) [1.219]   0.097     (0.292) [1.164]   0.156     (0.380) [1.176] 
Thüringen   0.184     (0.278) [1.277]  -0.295     (0.256) [1.248]  -0.122     (0.369) [1.222]   25  
 
Casuals   0.014     (0.037) [1.289]  -  -0.009     (0.047) [1.219] 
Disabled  -0.098     (0.073) [1.227]  -  -0.016     (0.093) [1.249] 
Part time  -0.010     (0.040) [1.489]  -  -0.040     (0.052) [1.442] 
Trainees  -0.015     (0.041) [1.391]  -   0.017     (0.054) [1.353] 
Foreigners   0.139     (0.103) [1.232]  -   0.163     (0.136) [1.214]  
Fluctuation  -0.021     (0.105) [1.171]  -   0.078     (0.143) [1.161] 
Constant   4.191*** (0.967)   4.779*** (0.778)   0.567      (0.916) 
R
2 (corrected)   0.296   0.208   0.488 
Cases 301 355 292 
 
Table A8 describes the complete regression results for medium and big businesses including 
standard deviations (in parentheses) and variance inflation factors [in parentheses]. 
Table A8 Complete regression results for medium and big businesses 
Target variable  CC  TC  SC 
Size   0.388*** (0.071) [2.084]   0.415*** (0.060) [1.584]   0.361*** (0.097) [1.589] 
Outsourcing  -0.230**  (0.106) [1.108]  -0.167     (0.110) [1.080]  -0.480*** (0.121) [1.100] 
Capitalintensive  -0.022     (0.107) [1.237]  -0.080     (0.108) [1.109]   0.148     (0.127) [1.189] 
EDIF    0.062     (0.232) [1.863]   0.113     (0.208) [1.417]  - 
EDIFP  -0.005     (0.486) [2.236]  -0.101     (0.363) [1.496]  - 
EDIS   0.259**  (0.201) [1.910]  -   0.302     (0.205) [1.395] 
EDISP   0.000     (0.337) [2.001]  -  -0.059     (0.309) [1.301] 
Age   0.092     (0.105) [2.035]   0.096     (0.095) [1.605]   0.210*    (0,117) [1.740] 
Trader   0.360     (0.326) [2.527]   0.084     (0.288) [1.907]   0.640*    (0.355) [2.054] 
Manufacturing business   0.156     (0.239) [1.892]   0.092     (0.246) [1.733]   0.295     (0.277) [1.757] 
Business services   0.378     (0.291) [1.709]   0.134     (0.291) [1.529]   0.387     (0.371) [1.672] 
Other services   0.753*** (0.280) [2.403]   0.302     (0.273) [2.087]   0.793**  (0.338) [2.510] 
Handicraft   0.249     (0.206) [1.962]   0.238     (0.208) [1.742]   0.273     (0.243) [1.914] 
Independent profession  -0.061     (0.270) [1.589]   0.152     (0.253) [1.430]  -0.018     (0.319) [1.575] 
Individual enterprise   0.818*    (0.457) [1.255]   0.846     (0.521) [1.212]  - 
Partnership   0.275     (0.356) [1.209]   0.088     (0.335) [1.172]  - 
GmbH & Co. KG   0.053     (0.206) [1.316]   0.036     (0.218) [1.253]  - 
Baden-Württemberg  -0.158     (0.261) [1.563]  -0,300     (0.279) [1.513]  -0.308     (0.302) [1.529] 
Berlin  -0.255     (0.500) [1.317]   0.098     (0.512) [1.195]  -0.005     (0.587) [1.248] 
Brandenburg  -0.061     (0.465) [1.417]   0.022     (0.544) [1.252]   0.292     (0.617) [1.282] 
Hamburg   0.509     (0.462) [1.355]  -0.142     (0.404) [1.234]   0.501     (0.550) [1.320] 
Hessen  -0.091     (0.426) [1.261]  -0.505     (0.417) [1.188]  -0,043     (0.474) [1.232]   26  
 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern   0.781     (0.507) [1.280]   0.547     (0.573) [1.181]   0.878     (0.659) [1.241] 
Niedersachsen   0.182     (0.279) [1.541]  -0.273     (0.282) [1.428]   0.171     (0.328) [1.515] 
Nordrhein-Westfalen   0.302     (0.234) [1.178]   0.093     (0.241) [1.751]   0.384     (0.273) [1.724] 
Rheinland-Pfalz   0.592     (0.664) [1.197]   0.064     (0.713) [1.191]   0.577     (0.673) [1.093] 
Sachsen   0.255     (0.437) [1.436]  -0.221     (0.412) [1.322]   0.023     (0.510) [1.343] 
Sachsen-Anhalt  -0.319     (0.498) [1.295]  -0.698     (0.526) [1.248]  -0.382     (0.594) [1.266] 
Schleswig-Holstein   0.138     (0.455) [1.243]  -0.582     (0.509) [1.156]   0.437     (0.572) [1.161] 
Thüringen   0.572     (0.589) [1.170]  -0.066     (0.566) [1.172]   0.373     (0.808) [1.148] 
Casuals  -0.145*    (0.075) [1.647]  -  -0.170*    (0.088) [1.439] 
Disabled  -0.076     (0.115) [1.220]  -  -0.143     (0.140) [1.274] 
Part time  -0.049     (0.074) [1.520]  -  -0.027     (0.088) [1.497] 
Trainees  -0.035     (0.105) [1.610]  -   0.066     (0.126) [1.565] 
Foreigners   0.142     (0.213) [1.475]  -   0.294     (0.251) [1.415]  
Fluctuation   0.138     (0.185) [1.210]  -   0.575*** (0.215) [1.148] 
Constant   1.937     (1.279)   1.985*    (1.074)   4.434*** (1.098) 
R
2 (corrected)   0.270   0.237   0.250 
Cases 209  215  212 
 
6.4 Regressions for recalculated costs 
In addition to personnel costs, external costs and other monetary costs the data set contains 
also information about the working effort of entrepreneurs and employees for tax compliance. 
This data can be deployed to control our regression results by an alternative estimate of 
overall compliance costs CC, tax-related costs TC and social insurance-related costs SC. For 
first we identify the average labour cost per hour within the data set. We obtain an average 
labour cost of 48.76 €.
20 The average personnel cost per hour is considerably higher than 
German average labour costs in 2003. This is not unexpected due to the fact that tax and 
social insurance-related compliance work is executed regularly by entrepreneurs, management 
personnel or professionals. Table A9 contains the correlation coefficients (standard errors) for 
the target values CC, TC and SC being calculated by average personnel costs in the data set. 
The results support the findings of our original regression models. 
                                                 
20  We also considered cases that have been considered as outliers in our original models. Ignoring these cases 
would result in a value of 48.55 €. Hence, the average value of labour costs is robust.   27  
 
Table A9 Regression results for average personnel costs 
Target variable  CC (S model)  CC (E model)  TC (S model)  TC (E model)  SC (S model)  SC (E model) 
Size   0.296*** (0.025)   0.324*** (0.040)   0.261*** (0.027)   0.261*** (0.034)   0.315*** (0.038)   0.312*** (0.053) 
Employment   0.423     (1.088)   0.257     (1.184)  -0.261    (1.158)  -0.331     (1.223) 12.956***  (0.546)  12.390*** (0.692) 
Outsourcing -0.252***  (0.060)  -0.239*** (0.069)  -0.230*** (0.065)  -0.191*** (0.069)  -0.421*** (0.070)  -0.397*** (0.078) 
Capitalintensive  -0.007     (0.058)   0.007     (0.067)  -0.060     (0.065)  -0.046     (0.069)   0.052     (0.071)   0.090     (0.079) 
EDIF    0.121     (0.139)   0.054     (0.161)  -0.083      (0.122)  -0.077      (0.129)  -  - 
EDIFP  -0.224     (0.262)  -0.129     (0.312)  -0.033      (0.222)  -0.013      (0.235)  -  - 
EDIS  -0.041     (0.122)   0.047     (0.142)  -  -    0.205     (0.124)    0.134     (0.141) 
EDISP   0.141     (0.213)   0.008     (0.237)  -  -   -0.150     (0.204)   -0.300     (0.229) 
Cashaccounting  -0.361     (0.373)  -0.869     (0.639)  -0.152     (0.424)   0.005     (0.499)  -  - 
Constant   5.369*** (1.141)   3.956*** (1.394)  10.132*** (1.220)  10.130*** (1.332)  -0.585      (0.590)  -1.402      (0.950) 
R
2 (corrected)    0.307   0.284   0.213   0.195   0.648   0.615 
Cases  460 369 422 401 458 372 
 
To control for a possible overestimation of labour costs per hour we also calculated 
alternative values for personnel costs by the average German labour cost of about 27.89 € in 
2003.
21 Due to the fact that tax work is regularly executed by entrepreneurs, management 
personnel or professionals, a considerable underestimation of the true labour cost per hour is 
to be expected. Even under these assumptions we find significant and negative effects for 
outsourcing tax and social insurance obligations. The result holds especially for the social 
insurance-related costs SC. 
                                                 
21  We deploy the average value from Statistisches Bundesamt (2007) for 2004 indexed to 2003  
(see http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/ 
VerdiensteArbeitskosten/Arbeitskosten/Tabellen/Content50/IndexJaehrlich,templateId=renderPrint.psml).   28  
 
Table A10 Regression results for average labour costs in 2003 
Target variable   CC (S model)   CC (E model)   TC (S model)   TC (E model)   SC (S model)   SC (E model) 
Size   0.312*** (0.024)   0.326*** (0.040)   0.277*** (0.027)    0.269*** (0.034)    0.330*** (0.037)    0.316*** (0.053) 
Employment   0.384     (1.078)   0.223     (1.174)  -0.291     (1.153)  -0.393      (1.218) 12.578***  (0.545) 12.039*** (0.687) 
Outsourcing  -0.132**  (0.059)  -0.125*    (0.068)  -0.110*    (0.065)  -0.075      (0.068)   -0.308*** (0.070)   -0.289*** (0.078) 
Capitalintensive   0.036     (0.057)   0.057     (0.066)  -0.020     (0.064)   0.000      (0.068)    0.094     (0.071)    0.135*    (0.079) 
EDIF    0.102     (0.138)   0.023     (0.160)   0.065     (0.122)   0.057      (0.128)  -  - 
EDIFP  -0.191     (0.259)  -0.056     (0.309)  -0.017     (0.221)   0.019      (0.234)  -  - 
EDIS   0.049     (0.121)   0.056     (0.141)  -  -    0.197     (0.124)     0.122    (0.140) 
EDISP   0.116     (0.211)  -0.016     (0.235)  -  -   -0.157    (0.203)    -0.295    (0.227) 
Cashaccounting  -0.321     (0.370)  -0.801     (0.634)  -0.110     (0.422)    0.060     (0.497)  -  - 
Constant   5.116*** (1.131)   3.849*** (1.383)   9.871*** (1.215)  10.015*** (1.326)   -0.311     (0.588)   -1.202     (0.943) 
R
2 (corrected)    0.318   0.290   0.220    0.208    0.639    0.608 
Cases   460   369   422    401    458    372 
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